Accepted papers

ID Title Presenter Authors Paper link Additional link 1
Additional link 2
1 Deliberation and Epistemic Democracy Huihui DING Huihui Ding, Marcus Pivato
2 Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets Rica Gonen Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
5 On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions Patrick Lederer Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer
6 Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures Martin Bullinger Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger
7 Approximate Group Fairness for Clustering Chenhao Wang Bo Li, Lijun Li, Ankang Sun, Chenhao Wang, Yingfan Wang
9 The Smoothed Satisfaction of Voting Axioms Lirong Xia Lirong Xia
10 For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods Nicholas Teh Jonathan Scarlett, Nicholas Teh, Yair Zick
11 Weighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation Mithun Chakraborty Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Warut Suksompong, Yair Zick Arxiv version slides
17 Fair and efficient collective decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus Jobst Heitzig Jobst Heitzig, Forest W. Simmons
18 Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion Ronen Gradwohl Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky Arxiv version
22 Threshold Task Games: Theory, Platform and Experiments Ta Duy Nguyen Kobi Gal, Ta Duy Nguyen, Quang Nhat Tran, Yair Zick
23 Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting Jaelle Scheuerman Jaelle Scheuerman, Jason Harman, Nicholas Mattei, K. Brent Venable
25 Nash Welfare and Facility Location Alexander Lam Alexander Lam, Haris Aziz, Toby Walsh
26 Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining Anna Bogomolnaia Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, Herve Moulinlin
27 Approximate and Strategyproof Maximin Share Allocation of Chores with Ordinal Preferences Bo Li Haris Aziz, Bo Li, Xiaowei Wu
28 Election Score Can Be Harder Than Winner Zack Fitzsimmons Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra
29 Every choice function is pro-con rationalizable Kemal YILDIZ Serhat Dogan, Kemal Yildiz
30 The Smoothed Likelihood of Doctrinal Paradoxes Ao Liu Ao Liu, Lirong Xia
31 Strategy-Proofness implies Minimal Participation if Voting is Costly Clemens Puppe Michael Mueller, Clemens Puppe My homepage
32 Indecision Modeling Duncan McElfresh Duncan C McElfresh, Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Vincent Conitzer, Jana Schaich Borg, John P Dickerson
33 Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data Itay Shtechman Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-HaLevi
35 Decision Scoring Rules Caspar Oesterheld Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
36 Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments Steven Jecmen Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Nihar B. Shah, Vincent Conitzer, Fei Fang
37 Loss Functions, Axioms, and Peer Review Nihar B. Shah Ritesh Noothigattu, Nihar B. Shah, Ariel Procaccia JAIR version
39 United for Change: Deliberative Coalition Formation to Change the Status Quo Davide Grossi Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
40 A Closer Look at the Cake-Cutting Foundations through the Lens of Measure Theory Robin Weishaupt Peter Kern, Daniel Neugebauer, Jörg Rothe, René L. Schilling, Dietrich Stoyan, Robin Weishaupt
41 On Approximate Envy-Freeness for Indivisible Chores and Mixed Resources A R Sricharan Umang Bhaskar, AR Sricharan, Rohit Vaish Arxiv version
43 Complexity of Sequential Rules in Judgment Aggregation Linus Boes Dorothea Baumeister, Linus Boes, Robin Weishaupt
44 Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes René Romen Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen–KNZrzGlFC-Cv6_
45 Four Faces of Altruistic Hedonic Games Anna Maria Kerkmann Anna Maria Kerkmann, Jörg Rothe
46 Complexity of Scheduling and Predicting Round-Robin Tournaments Tobias Hogrebe Dorothea Baumeister, Tobias Hogrebe
47 Online selection of diverse committees Virginie Do Virginie Do, Jamal Atif, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Usunier
49 Primarily About Primaries Omer Lev Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah, Tyrone Strangway
50 Learning preferences in an accumulation-to-threshold model of decision making Taher Rahgooy Taher Rahgooy, K. Brent Venable, Jerome R. Busemeyer
52 Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation Erel Segal-Halevi Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong Arxiv version
55 Approval-Based Apportionment Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Kai Wilker
56 Perpetual Voting: The Axiomatic Lens Jan Maly Martin Lackner, Jan Maly
57 Efficient Computation and Strategic Control in Conditional Approval Voting Papasotiropoulos Georgios Markakis Evangelos, Papasotiropoulos Georgios
58 Equitable Division of a Path Chinmay Sonar Neeldhara Misra, Chinmay Sonar, P. R. Vaidyanathan, Rohit Vaish Arxiv version Slides
59 Tracking Truth by Weighting Proxies in Liquid Democracy Yuzhe Zhang Yuzhe Zhang, Davide Grossi
60 Selecting Matchings via Multiwinner Voting: How Structure Defeats a Large Candidate Space Markus Brill Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
61 Designing Participatory Budgeting Mechanisms Grounded in Judgment Aggregation Simon Rey Simon Rey, Ulle Endriss, Ronald de Haan
63 Dynamic Proportional Rankings Jonas Israel Jonas Israel, Markus Brill
64 Manipulation of Opinion Polls to Influence Iterative Elections Ann-Kathrin Selker Dorothea Baumeister, Ann-Kathrin Selker, Anaelle Wilczynski
66 Behavioral Stable Marriage Problems Andrea Mrtin Andrea Martin, Kristen Brent Venable, Nicholas Mattei
69 Proportional Representation under Single-Crossing Preferences Revisited Andrei Constantinescu Andrei Constantinescu, Edith Elkind
70 On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching Jiehua Chen Jiehua Chen, Adrian Chmurovic, Fabian Jogl, Manuel Sorge Arxiv version
71 Winner Robustness via Swap- and Shift-Bribery: Parameterized Counting Complexity and Experiments Niclas Boehmer Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier
72 Putting a Compass on the Map of Elections Piotr Faliszewski Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Stanisław Szufa
73 The Price is (Probably) Right: Learning Market Equilibria from Samples Vignesh Viswanathan Omer Lev, Neel Patel, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick Arxiv version
74 Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind Andrew Searns Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns
77 Keeping Your Friends Close: Land Allocation with Friends Neel Patel Edith Elkind, Neel Patel, Alan Tsang, Yair Zick
78 Making Group Decisions from Natural Language-Based Preferences Farhad Mohsin Farhad Mohsin, Lei Luo, Wufei Ma, Inwon Kang, Zhibing Zhao, Ao Liu, Rohit Vaish, Lirong Xia
80 High Dimensional Model Explanations: An Axiomatic Approach Neel Patel Neel Patel, Martin Strobel, Yair Zick
81 Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don’t Add Up Ayumi Igarashi Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick
82 The Borda Class: An Axiomatic Study of the Borda Rule on Top-Truncated Preferences Zoi Terzopoulou Zoi Terzopoulou, Ulle Endriss
83 Little House (Seat) on the Prairie: Compactness, Gerrymandering, and Population Distribution Tyrone Strangway Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah, Tyrone Strangway
84 Multistage Committee Elections Robert Bredereck Robert Bredereck,Till Fluschnik, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk Arxiv version
85 Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation Yotam Gafni Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
86 Unified Fair Allocation for Indivisible Goods and Chores via Copies Xin Huang Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
87 Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations Tomer Ezra Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, and Uriel Feige
89 On social networks that support learning Fedor Sandomirskiy Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
90 (Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond) Avi Cohen Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat Arxiv version
91 Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements Moshe Babaioff Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, and Uriel Feige
94 Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Cardinal Utilities Piotr Skowron Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron
95 Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions Grzegorz Pierczyński Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Nisarg Shah, Piotr Skowron
96 Evaluating Committees for Representative Democracies: the Distortion and Beyond Michał Jaworski Michał Jaworski and Piotr Skowron
97 An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections Michał Tomasz Godziszewski Michał Tomasz Godziszewski, PAweł Batko, Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski
99 Proportional Approval Voting, Harmonic k-Median, and Negative Association Krzysztof Sornat Jarosław Byrka, Piotr Skowron and Krzysztof Sornat Poster